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When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly a dog

When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly a dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response to Chrysippus’ paradox was onesto claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not verso dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is a dog, then, given the norma account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Mediante fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is verso proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus verso hair – which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and sopra fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply preciso avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar ombra. But the maximality principle may seem onesto be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark durante unison? If verso thing is verso dog, shouldn’t it be athletique of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested a reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (mediante various different ways) from one another and Oscar by a hair, as dogs, and per fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is per Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still in place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later preciso become definitely Dalmatians; some con per day, some durante verso second, or verso split second. It seems arbitrary sicuro proclaim verso Dalmatian part that is verso split second away from becoming definitely a Dalmatian, verso Dalmatian, while denying that one verso day away is verso Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems onesto favor one of the latter type according to which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” In any case, come utilizzare bookofmatches the canone account of identity seems unable on its own to handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus per hair is per dog – and per Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark in unison mai more loudly than Oscar barks alone.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases verso piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into a statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into a ball and fashions verso new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes per part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using verso new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by per new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Verso natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical puro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical preciso \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical puro \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical puro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By a similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical onesto both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the standard account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants con quantified modal logic are puro be handled exactly as they are mediante first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced sicuro affirm that distinct physical objects addirittura time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The norma account is thus prima facie incompatible with the natural pensiero that constitution is identity.

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